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Response to Keeping Cases from Black
Juries: An Empirical Analysis of How
Race, Income Inequality, and Regional
History Affect Tort Law
Jennifer Wriggins*
Abstract
Issues of race and racism in the U.S. torts system continue to
deserve much more attention from legal scholarship than they
receive, and Keeping Cases from Black Juries is a valuable
contribution. Studying racism as it infects the torts system is
difficult because explicit de jure exclusions of black jurors are in
the past; race is no longer on the surface of tort opinions; and
court records do not reveal the race of tort plaintiffs, defendants,
or jurors. Yet it is essential to try and understand the workings of
race and racism in the torts system. The authors pose a question
that is probably impossible to definitively answer but that is very
important to explore: where state legislatures and courts continue
to retain outmoded tort doctrines like contributory negligence,
which tend to limit plaintiffs’ access to juries, is this because state
legislatures and judges believe juries with large concentrations of
African-Americans and low-income people will unacceptably
distribute wealth to plaintiffs? The term “Bronx effect” alludes to
this alleged phenomenon. No other article has rigorously tried to
link the so-called Bronx effect with the perpetuation of outmoded
tort doctrines. The authors use a complex interdisciplinary
approach to rank states in terms of the degree to which their tort
doctrines deny plaintiffs’ access to juries. Digging deep into factors
that might affect a state’s ranking, they then find strong
correlations between a state’s law making it difficult for plaintiffs
to reach a jury, and a state’s having a large African-American
*
Sumner T. Bernstein Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs, University of Maine School of Law.
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population and/or being part of the South. This and other
findings in the article are significant, bringing to light a racebased exclusionary pattern in the legal system. The pattern of
keeping cases from black buries also likely leads to
undercompensation of African-American plaintiffs, my response
explains. The article deserves a place in torts scholarship
generally, in critical race scholarship, and in empirical legal
scholarship. While it is not surprising that definitive causal
conclusions are lacking, implicit bias may shed light on the
mechanisms by which these outmoded doctrines endure. The
article’s calls for reform are reasonable in light of the evidence of
the study and other torts scholarship.
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I. Introduction
Keeping Cases from Black Juries: An Empirical Analysis of
How Race, Income Inequality and Regional History Affect Tort
Law,1 by Donald G. Gifford and Brian Jones, is one of a small
number of works that explore torts, race, and racism.2 Racism
1.
2.

73 WASH & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016).
For other works discussing this nexus of issues, see generally MARTHA
CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND
TORT LAW (2010); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching
for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761 (1996); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts,
Race, and the Value of Injury 1900-1949, 49 HOW. L. J. 99 (2005) [hereinafter
Wriggins, Torts and Race]; Jennifer B. Wriggins, Constitution Day Lecture:
Constitutional Law and Tort Law: Injury, Race, Gender, and Equal Protection,
63 ME. L. REV. 263 (2010) [hereinafter Wriggins, Constitutional Law].
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(blatant and subtle) in the U.S. remains a scourge despite all the
progress that has been made. The torts system is the premier
mechanism of compensation for personal injuries in the U.S. and
is an important part of all law schools’ educational programs.
Studying any aspect of the torts system is methodologically
challenging. Some of the challenges include that tort law doctrine
varies from state to state, operates in a decentralized way,
features many unreported judicial decisions, and operates with a
large majority of cases settling without a public record of the
settlement amount.3 Interdisciplinary, empirical approaches are
indispensable in understanding how the torts system works.
Studying racism as it affects and infuses the torts system is
particularly difficult. Explicit de jure exclusions of black jurors
are in the past and race4 is not on the surface of tort opinions any
more.5 Further, court records now do not reveal the race of tort
plaintiffs, defendants, or jurors, making it daunting for
researchers to explore issues of tort liability or damages as they
relate to race.6 Historically, there has not been much race-specific
torts doctrine.7 Black plaintiffs have sued and won under the
3. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race
and Remedies 1867-2007, 27 REV. OF LIT. 37, 38–39 (2007) [hereinafter Wriggins,
Thoughts on Race and Remedies].
4. The Article and my response are not adding to the extensive legal
literature on the social construction of and indeterminacy of race, see, e.g., Ian
Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 1, 21 (1994) (discussing the
argument that “race [is] but one component in the formation of ethnic groups”),
but are looking at the ways race and perceptions of race may operate in the legal
system and society. In these comments, I am using “African-American” and
“black” interchangeably. Of course, there are many issues of race, ethnicity, and
juries that neither these brief comments nor the Article deal with.
5. See Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and Remedies, supra note 3, at 60–61
(“New attention to race and damages, particularly from Emancipation to 1950,
paints a complex picture showing that race and racism are not extrinsic to torts
but are as surely a part of it as is industrial development.”).
6. For example, researchers trying to determine how jury composition
affects damages have to use census data that includes racial composition of
populations to estimate racial composition of juries rather than actual jury
composition. See Eric Hellan & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, & American
Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 26, 52 (2003)
(“[W]e do not have data on the composition of the jury, and we must therefore
infer jury characteristics from county characteristics.”).
7. See Wriggins, Torts and Race, supra note 2, at 105 n.26 (“I believe
many structural factors, such as the all-white legal system, probably made it
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torts system since the end of slavery, though the damages they
have won have not been commensurate with the damages won by
whites in many instances.8 The use of explicitly race-based data
in tort litigation for determining damages, long attacked by
scholars, has been held unconstitutional on several occasions.9
Yet, race matters in torts as in the rest of the U.S. legal system. 10
Given the current situation where race is no longer on the surface
of judicial opinions, new approaches are needed to gain traction
for understanding race and torts on the ground now. In this
response, I will describe the authors’ approach, the significance of
their project, its place in the legal literature, and the meaning of
their findings.
II. The Approach
The authors develop an interdisciplinary approach to
exploring the questions they pose. Their hypothesis is
that judges and state legislators often believe that juries with
a substantial percentage of African-American or low-income
jurors are more inclined to find for personal injury victims and
award higher damages and that these perceptions have led
them to adopt rules making it more difficult for plaintiffs to
have their cases decided by juries.11

Of necessity, this hypothesis has several steps and
interlocking aspects. The authors begin by describing the
assumption, held by many vocal critics of the torts system, that
predominately African-American and poor urban juries
redistribute wealth in tort cases to plaintiffs by ruling against
defendants who should not be held liable given the evidence, and
by awarding plaintiffs inordinately high damage awards.12
more difficult for black plaintiffs to win on liability, but clear doctrinal rules
were not discernible.”).
8. See generally id. (discussing damages statistics across racial lines);
Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and Remedies, supra note 3 (same).
9. G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 92 F. Supp. 3d. 53, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); McMillan v.
City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
10. See Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and Remedies, supra note 3, at60–61
(discussing the historical importance of race in torts cases).
11. Gifford & Jones, supra note 1, at 561.
12. See id. at 559 (“The image of the disproportionately African-American
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Second, they turn to describe tort doctrines, enduring in some
states, that would seem to keep plaintiffs’ cases from getting to a
jury by resulting in defendants’ success in pretrial dismissal
motions and in fewer plaintiffs’ cases being brought in the first
place.13 An important example of this type of doctrine is
traditional contributory negligence. This doctrine provides that if
a plaintiff contributes even in small part to her injury, she is
wholly barred from recovery. It has been abolished by court
decision or statutes in all but a few states, but how do we know
that these types of doctrines keep plaintiffs’ cases from getting to
a jury? Looking at the all-or-nothing nature of the doctrine itself,
it seems inevitable that the existence of the doctrine in a state
would indeed result in more defendants’ success in pretrial
dismissal motions and in fewer plaintiffs’ cases being filed at all.
But proving that contributory negligence or other seemingly
pro-defendant doctrines actually cause more dismissals or fewer
cases to be brought is challenging to say the least. To respond to
this challenge, the authors creatively developed a quantitative
Jury Access Denial Index (JADI), which analyzed the tort
doctrine in each state and the extent to which it prevented
plaintiffs’ cases from getting to a jury.14 First, they looked at tort
doctrines such as contributory negligence in the substantive law
of each state.15 Recognizing that endurance of old-fashioned
doctrines alone is not sufficient even to provide any estimate as to
how much each doctrine contributes to failures of plaintiffs’ cases
to reach a jury, they assembled a panel of twelve expert judges
and practitioners to assess the relative significance of each of the
doctrines in order to give each doctrine appropriate weight in the
index.16 Then, using the law of seventeen states chosen for
meeting certain criteria (such as whether it retained contributory
negligence, geographic diversity and other factors)17, and the
relative weight of the various doctrines as determined by the
and poor urban jury redistributing wealth has dominated the political debate
surrounding the tort system for the past generation.”).
13. See id. at 571 (discussing “substantive legal principles that play
important roles in dismissing tort cases”).
14. See id. at 611–27 (providing the index and discussing its results).
15. Id. at 614.
16. Id. at 613.
17. Id. at 614.
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panel of experts, they assigned a Jury Access Denial Index (JADI)
score to each of the seventeen states. At the end of this part of the
analysis, the authors ranked each state in terms of the degree to
which the state’s tort doctrines make a plaintiff’s access to a jury
determination more difficult.18
Does the first aspect, the assumption that predominately
poor and urban African-American juries are “too” pro-plaintiff,
relate in some causal fashion to the second aspect, the juryaccess-denying nature of a state’s substantive tort law? Even to
articulate the question of this relationship shows both how
difficult it is to resolve and how important this question and
whole area of inquiry are.
It is worth stepping back for a moment and considering some
of the dimensions of the authors’ hypothesis that there is a link
between jury denial and low-income and African-American
populations (and thus jurors) and the implications if it is correct.
First, doctrines and rules that deny plaintiffs’ access to jury trials
will apply to all plaintiffs regardless of race (at least in theory). In
addition, one important yet implicit aspect of this hypothesis has
to do with the perceived race of the plaintiffs. Part of the
perception that urban, predominately African-American juries
are “out-of-control” stems from the notion that these juries are
awarding “excessive” damages for the injuries of poor AfricanAmericans. This aspect of the perception is not made explicit but
is a subtext. In the urban, predominately poor, largely AfricanAmerican areas from which these allegedly “out-of-control” juries
are drawn it is likely that at least a significant fraction of the
plaintiffs will be African-American.19 And these purportedly “outof-control” urban, predominately African-American juries are
presumably awarding excessive damages to victims whose
injuries do not “deserve” such compensation. Scholarship has
traced the enduring “race-based discount” of the torts system
applied to African-Americans’ injuries.20 Gifford and Jones do not
18. Id. at 616.
19. Contingency fee agreements provide a widespread funding mechanism
for funding personal injury litigation. See Wriggins, Torts and Race, supra note
2, at106–07.
20. See, e.g., id. at 105, 138 (discussing cases treating black plaintiffs
differently from white plaintiffs); Wriggins, Constitutional Law, supra note 2, at
271 n.40 (describing “race-based discount”); Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and
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directly focus on the “race-based discount,” but give additional
resonance to the questions posed. If we consider this aspect more
explicitly, we see that the broad questions posed by their Article
are both about access to jury service for African-Americans in
poor urban areas and, as important, access to tort remedies by
African-Americans in these areas. Framed as such, this piece
resonates with current activism concerning racial justice in the
criminal justice system; for example, the Black Lives Matter
movement.
Returning to the hypothesis that the perception of overly
redistributive urban poor African-American juries has led judges
and legislators to restrict jury access, how does it fare in the
actual analysis? The authors in Part IV, Table 1, include their
JADI ranking of seventeen regionally disparate states which has
five southern states (plus Texas) as the most jury-denying.21 This
is very interesting, but not definitive (and not intended to be).
The authors go on to review their multiple regression analysis of
income inequality in a state’s major cities (with the widely used
‘Gini’ coefficient measuring the degree of income inequality) to
see if high income inequality in a state’s major cities correlates
with a high JADI.22 They find there is some, but not statistically
significant, correlation.23 They then explain that their analysis
finds a statistically significant relationship between states where
the largest cities include a higher percentage of African-American
residents and a much higher JADI.24 As they note, “a higher
percentage of African-Americans in the population is likely to
have a large or substantial effect on JADI scores.”25 They also
find an even stronger relationship between a state’s history as
part of the South and a higher JADI score which is clearly
statistically significant.26 Then they go on to note the complexity
Remedies, supra note 3, at 37 (same).
21. Gifford & Jones, supra note 1, at 616.
22. See id. at 618 (“Publicity about “out-of-control juries” focuses on urban
juries, not those in suburban and rural areas. In some states, a single city, such
as Boston, dominates the images that judges and legislators have about urban
juries.”).
23. Id. at 619.
24. Id. at 620.
25. Id. at 620 n.279.
26. Id. at 621.
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of the relationships between the variables, finding, for example,
that even in northern cities a higher percentage of AfricanAmericans means a higher JADI.27 In their conclusion, the
authors note that because racial biases are often unexpressed in
the twenty-first century, they can only prove “strong correlations
between a state’s substantive law that makes it difficult for
personal injury plaintiffs to have their cases decided by a jury
and the factors of race and being part of the south, and not
causation.”28 However, they assert, “these strong correlations,
particularly when coupled with the historical treatment of
African-Americans, most egregiously in the South, suggest that
these intertwined factors explain the continued observance of
these doctrines discarded a generation ago by the overwhelming
majority of other courts.”29 In other words, they are suggesting
that the strong correlations combined with regional history do
demonstrate causation. They go on to question the legitimacy of
stare decisis in this context30 and to assert that the outmoded
doctrines such as contributory negligence should be rejected as
they are antiquated and “infused with the racial biases of a past
era.”31 The findings of the Article are not conclusive, but that is
not surprising given the complexity of the torts system and the
available (and unavailable) data. The lack of definitiveness,
however, does not eviscerate the Article’s significance.
III. Why This Matters So Much
The Article is important for several reasons outlined here.
The policy reasons for changing torts doctrines as the authors
advocate have been thoroughly explored elsewhere; this Article
adds an essential dimension to the debates about reforming tort
doctrines.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 622–23.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 631.
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A. Exclusion of Urban African-American Jurors.
One focus of the Article is on the exclusion of urban AfricanAmerican jurors from hearing tort cases. The Article aims to
show how the retention of antiquated torts doctrines, particularly
in southern states, prevents plaintiffs from getting to juries,
resulting in predominately poor African-American juries being
not allowed to decide plaintiffs’ cases.
Exclusion of urban African-American jurors from hearing
tort cases is wrong in many ways. The torts system is part of our
legal system and jury participation in civil or criminal cases is an
important aspect of civic engagement and citizenship. Exclusion
of any group from participation in that responsibility is
illegitimate in and of itself. Exclusion from jury service in tort
cases on the basis of race violates potential jurors’ equal
protection rights.32 As the Supreme Court wrote in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete,33 “to permit racial exclusion in this official
forum compounds the racial insult in judging a person by the
color of his or her skin.”34 Second, exclusion of any group from
that responsibility is harmful and stigmatizing to the group,
suggesting their contributions are worthless.35 Third, denying the
opportunity to serve on a jury to members of the group is
damaging and insulting to each individual member of the group,
reflecting a view that his or her contributions are valueless. The
Edmonson court wrote that “racial discrimination in the quality
or selection of jurors offends the dignity of persons.”36 Exclusion
of a group and its members from making jury determinations is
harmful to society as a whole. If we believe in juries as a way of
resolving civil disputes (granted this is a contested way of
resolving civil disputes), we must believe that the quality of
decisionmaking will be degraded by excluding African-Americans.

32. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991)
(noting “that a prosecutor’s race-based peremptory challenge violates the equal
protection rights of those excluded from jury service”).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 620.
35. Id. at 628 (“To permit racial exclusion in this official forum compounds
the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin.”).
36. Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991)).
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B. Exclusion Leading to Undercompensation of African-American
Plaintiffs.
Tort law and adjudication embody an inherent tension
between the principles of equality (in this context, that like cases
should be treated alike) and of individualized adjudication (the
idea that cases should be decided in an individualized,
decentralized way by decisionmakers who are not constrained by
a requirement of uniform treatment). I have discussed this
tension at length in the context of race, racism, and torts.37 As
noted above, one possible consequence of continuing past juryaccess-denying doctrines in geographic areas with high
concentrations of poor African-Americans is that the race-based
discount applied to African-Americans’ tort claims will continue
(since in those areas a high concentration of plaintiffs will be
African-American and their tort claims will be subject to juryaccess-denying doctrines).38
Part of the subtext here and elsewhere is that injuries to
members of this group do not “count” for as much as injuries to
members of other groups, as my historical analysis of tort law
and damage awards has shown.39 This is another reason why the
Article’s inquiry is important. Even though there is no consensus
in torts scholarship as to what the “correct” level of compensation
for injuries should be, there must be consensus that like cases
should be treated alike and that tort claims brought by AfricanAmericans should not be undervalued relative to others’ tort
claims on the basis of race. The race-based discount applied to
claims brought by poor, African-American plaintiffs, effectuated
in part by the continuation of jury-access-denying doctrines, is a
violation of basic equality and equal protection principles. While
in the past some appellate judges in determining wrongful death
damages actually grouped cases involving white decedents in
different categories from cases involving black decedents, as if the

37. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2 (citing sources discussing these
issues).
38. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 2, at 52–62 (discussing cases
where African-American plaintiffs’ claims had been dismissed).
39. See sources cited supra note 2 (discussing why African-American
plaintiffs are often awarded less damages than other plaintiffs).
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injury was different in kind because of the decedents’ race,40 that
and other race-based devaluation should be long gone. Reflecting
a newer understanding, some courts recently have found that
making damage determinations based on race-based earnings or
life expectancy tables violates equality and equal protection
principles.41
Devaluing claims brought by poor African-Americans has
additional negative consequences. First, an inordinately low
damage award denies victims and their families the possibility of
a foundation for future financial stability, which has ripple effects
for generations to come.42 Second, the devaluation cannot help
but have negative psychic consequences for the individuals
involved and the group more broadly, contributing to
demoralization and justifiable anger. Third, if members of a
group are undercompensated, defendants determining the
appropriate level of precautions can be expected to adjust down
the level of precautions taken to prevent harm to residents in
poor and African-American neighborhoods, applying Learned
Hand’s formula and other cost-benefit analysis. Last, whites
benefit in a corrupt and corrupting way from the devaluation of
injuries to poor, African-American people.
IV. Conclusion
Gifford and Jones’ Article deserves a significant place in
contemporary torts scholarship. The creation of the JADI index is
a notable contribution and likely to be useful beyond this Article.
Publishing the JADI index for all fifty states would be very
40. See Wriggins, Torts and Race, supra note 2, at 124–25 (“[T]o these
courts, the principle of treating like cases alike meant comparing deaths of black
people only with the deaths of other black people. Deaths of white people,
because they were excluded from the analysis, seem to have been considered
another kind of harm.”).
41. See cases cited supra note 9 (citing cases where the courts have made
this determination).
42. See Wriggins, Thoughts on Race and Remedies, supra note 3, at 61
(noting that “the cumulative effect of even small differences in damage remedies
may be great over time”); Wriggins, Constitutional Law, supra note 2, at 270
n.36 (“A $2,500 award in 1909 might have enabled [an African-American
plaintiff’s] family to buy a house, pay for education, or take other steps that
might build wealth for future generations.”).
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interesting. There are additional paths for future inquiry to
explore with the JADI index. One possible path is suggested in
the question mentioned in the text about the role of the idea of
individual responsibility in retention of certain tort doctrines.43 It
would be instructive to know if this idea relates to the JADI in all
states, including predominately rural, white states. Do some
rural, white states evince a powerful and widespread idea of
individual responsibility that contributes to retention of certain
doctrines? Also, where do other southern states fall in the JADI
index—for example, Louisiana? Louisiana may be an outlier since
it has had a different role for juries due to its justice system
having originated with French law rather than English law.44
Given my research on Louisiana’s tort history and race, I wonder
whether Louisiana has a lower JADI than other southern
states.45 Also, Louisiana’s damage doctrines are different from
those of common law states. Could damage doctrines (and
damage caps) in different states be used to create other JADI
indices that would also be illuminating? As race and racism are
important parts of the torts system, mainstream contemporary
torts scholarship should, as this Article does, recognize and
grapple with their importance. The Article also deserves a place
in critical race scholarship, which has not focused much on torts.
As this Article looks at race and law in new and ground-breaking
ways, delving far beneath and “beyond” the surface of legal
doctrine, it is a critical race theory project. Moreover, it goes
beyond stated formal equality and nondiscrimination principles
to interrogate actual inequality on the ground. The Article also
merits a place in empirical legal scholarship generally. It
rigorously uses a mix of legal doctrine, qualitative analysis, and
quantitative analysis, to shed genuine light on ways the legal
system works. The way the authors combined their analytical
43. See Gifford & Jones, supra note 1, at 600 n.202 (discussing the role of
individual responsibility in southern Protestant culture).
44. See William E. Crawford, Life on a Federal Island in a Civilian Sea, 15
MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (explaining that Louisiana appellate courts have the
authority to make their own findings of damages as long as there is record
evidence to support them, can find a civil defendant guilty when a jury had
exonerated the defendant, and can reverse jury findings on the facts and make a
contrary decision).
45. For a discussion of torts and race in Louisiana Law at length, see
Wriggins, Torts and Race, supra note 2, at 99.
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methods is deft and perhaps could be replicated with other
questions.
The authors note that they have found strong correlations
but not definitive causation, which would be impossible to prove,
particularly where their hypothesis involved so many different
actors over a wide geographic area and a decades-long time
period.46 The torts system is complex. For example, even in the
height of the Jim Crow era in the Deep South, some black
plaintiffs won tort cases heard by all-white juries and all-white
judges.47 Further, as Professor Dayna Bowen Mathew has stated,
“Americans now seldom espouse the overt racism, prejudice and
bigotry that our laws prohibit.”48 Leaving aside the challenges of
finding motive, the finding of a statistically significant correlation
between a high JADI index and cities with large AfricanAmerican populations is powerful. At a minimum, this finding
creates a disparate impact on black juries (and I argue black
plaintiffs as well). In and of itself, and coupled with other
analytical work recommending reform of doctrines such as
contributory negligence, this disparity should be a catalyst for
reform.
Research from the past several decades tells us that implicit
bias gives a powerful way of thinking about the Article’s
findings.49 Implicit bias may be at work in most of the decisions to
retain old tort doctrines made by judges and/or legislatures in the
southern or northern states that retain some of these doctrines.
But drawing tight conclusions as to causation is impossible.50 As
Professor Mathew has recently shown in her excellent recent
book,51 implicit bias research can usefully shed light on patterns
of discrimination in decentralized, multi-actor decisions when
46. Recall that their hypothesis refers to decisions of “judges and state
legislators” generally. Gifford & Jones, supra note 1, at 562.
47. Wriggins, Torts and Race, supra note 2, at 100 n.7, 110–36 (discussing
cases of that era).
48. DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE 39–40 (2015).
49. See generally id. (explaining how implicit bias affects health
disparities).
50. Id. For a more detailed discussion of implicit bias, see generally
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006).
51. Id.
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explicit intent is not on the surface. The context she writes about
is the U.S. health care system but many of her insights may
apply here as well. The absence of tight, definitive “proof” of
causation should not be fatal to the authors’ calls for reforms. As
long as we have a jury system for civil cases, there is no excuse
for keeping cases from black juries.

